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Abstract
In this paper, we characterize the relationship between the initial distribution of
human capital and physical inheritances among individuals and the long-run distri-
bution of these two variables. In a model with indivisible investment in education,
we analyze how the initial distribution of income determines the posterior intergen-
erational mobility in human capital and the evolution of intragenerational income
inequality. This analysis enables us in turn to characterize the e¤ects of scal policy
on future income distribution and mobility when the composition of intergenera-
tional transfers is endogenous. To this end, we consider the following government
interventions: a pay-as-you-go social security system, a tax on inheritance, a tax
on capital income, a tax on labor income, and a subsidy on education investment.
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1 Introduction
The question of how inequality is generated and evolves over time is one of the
major concerns in economic analysis. In the last decades a large number of studies
have provided evidence supporting the presumption that intergenerational transfers
are key to explain the empirical distribution of income and wealth.1 Moreover, as
intergenerational transfers could take the form of either physical capital (through
bequests) or human capital (through investment in education), there is also empirical
evidence documenting that both types of transfers a¤ect the distribution of relevant
economic variables among individuals. For instance, the empirical analysis of dAddio
(2007) conrms both the importance of education on mobility and the intergenerational
persistence of inequality. In this paper, we follow this line of research and show
analytically how the joint initial distribution of bequest and human capital, as well
as scal policy, determines the average level and the intragenerational distribution of
income in the long run.
Investment in education is a key factor of income inequality.2 As was pointed
out by Galor and Zeira (1993), and many other papers, there are two main features
that give rise to this relationship. On the one hand, the technology of human capital
accumulation exhibits a non-convexity since the investment in education is indivisible.
This technological feature implies that access to education by the poorest individuals
depends on whether they can borrow or not. On the other hand, when there are
capital market imperfections resulting in borrowing constraints, those individuals with
an income below some threshold value cannot a¤ord the cost of education.3 Therefore,
the initial distribution of wealth determines the number of individuals who can acquire
education and, thus, the aggregate stock of human capital and the rate of economic
growth. This mechanism linking education with income distribution and growth was
already widely analyzed in the literature by authors like Galor and Zeira (1993), García-
Peñalosa (1995), Galor and Tsiddon (1997), and Owen and Weil (1998), among others.
Intergenerational transfers from parents to children account for a part of the
observed inequality since these transfers help to ameliorate the negative e¤ects of
borrowing constraints on the accumulation of human capital. In an environment with
credit market imperfections, only those individuals who receive a su¢ ciently large
inheritance can invest in human capital (see Becker and Tomes, 1976; Eckstein and
Zilcha, 1994; or Behrman et al., 1995). Regarding the dynamics of income distribution,
Galor and Zeira (1993) show that, if one assumes credit market imperfections and
a non-convex education technology, then the inherited distribution of wealth entirely
determines the accumulation of human capital and the dynamics of the distribution of
income.
The literature that we have reviewed above has not considered simultaneously the
two types of intergenerational transfers we have mentioned: (i) transfers of physical
capital by means of bequests; and (ii) transfers of human capital by means of the
parents investment in the education of their children. In this paper, we consider
the interaction between the composition of intergenerational transfers and income
1See, for instance, Becker and Tomes (1986), dAddio (2007), Gokhale et al. (2001), Gokhale and
Kotliko¤ (2002), Laitner (2002) or Wolf (2002), among many others.
2García-Peñalosa (1994) or Aghion et al. (1999) review the literature that examines the role of
education on the link between distribution and growth.
3See, for instance, Dynarski (2002) or Keane (2002) for a discussion of the role of borrowing
constraints on decisions concerning human capital acquisition.
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distribution when education is nanced by parents.4 To this end, our paper develops
a model of a small open economy populated by overlapping generations of individuals
who di¤er in the amount and composition of inherited transfers from parents. In this
economy the disposable lifetime income of an individual is fully determined by the
bequest and human capital inherited from his parent. In addition to the imperfection
of the capital market and the non-convexity of the education technology, we introduce
two crucial assumptions. One is that the intergenerational transfers arise because
individuals care about the starting opportunities of their children and thus they take
into account the disposable income of their o¤spring. More precisely, we assume that
parents derive utility from their contribution to the future lifetime income of their
children without discriminating between the two types of intergenerational transfers
used for making such a contribution. The second important assumption is that there
exists an asymmetry between the two types of intergenerational transfers as they
take place at di¤erent moments of individuals lifetime and they exhibit di¤erent
contributions to the o¤springs lifetime income. Individuals can only attend to the
school before going to the labor market and receiving a physical inheritance from their
parents. Moreover, due to the borrowing constraints, individuals can only have access
to education if their parents pay its cost. Finally, as it is standard in the literature, we
assume the marginal return on human capital investment is larger than the marginal
return on physical capital investment. Given our motive for intergenerational transfers,
parents obtain thus larger marginal gains from investing in their childrens education
than from leaving bequest.
The income of parents then drives the total contribution to the future lifetime
income of their children. The composition of this contribution between the two types
of transfers is endogenous in our model and depends on the relative returns of these
transfers. However, since we assume that the investment in education is indivisible and
that parents cannot force their children to give them transfers, if the cost of education is
su¢ ciently large, parents will not nance the cost of education and, thus, they will only
leave bequest to their o¤spring. Obviously, this occurs to parents with an income level
below some threshold. In this way, the initial distribution of income drives the evolution
of the composition of intergenerational transfers and, thus, the size of the educated
population along the equilibrium path. This simple mechanism explains how the initial
distribution of income determines the posterior evolution of intragenerational income
inequality and of intergenerational mobility in terms of human capital. This dynamics
implies that, under reasonable parameter values, non-educated but su¢ ciently rich
parents will educate their descendents and educated parents will always educate their
descendents. Therefore, only upward mobility is possible in our simple model, which
explains the increasing access to education in most countries during the second half of
the last century. Our model also implies that social mobility ends when the economy
reaches the steady state, which is characterized by a two-class society composed of rich
educated individuals and poor non-educated individuals.
Our mechanism behind the dynamics of income distribution delivers two important
insights for human capital accumulation, inequality, and growth. First, since the income
of parents depends on the composition of their initial inheritance, the dynamics of
economic activity depends not only on the initial distribution of wealth, but also on the
4 In a related paper, Zilcha (2003) shows that di¤erences in the composition of intergenerational
transfers may partly explain the cross-country di¤erences in growth and inequality. However, he
assumes that this composition is exogenously given.
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initial distribution of human capital. Our model then characterizes a new mechanism
relating the distribution of human capital with growth and inequality. Second, and
probably more important, the relative return of human capital accumulation determines
the access to education of the middle class. This result is quite intuitive. Since there
is a wedge between the returns from the two types of transfers, there exists a non
degenerated interval of income levels for which all the parents with those levels of
income optimally choose to pay the education costs and to leave no physical bequest.
Outside this interval, those parents with a larger income level educate and leave
bequest, whereas those parents with a smaller income level leave bequest and do not
educate. Therefore, both the accumulation of human capital and the dynamics of
income inequality crucially depend on the initial mass of individuals with a level of
income inside the aforementioned interval. Furthermore, the length of this interval
is fully determined by the wedge between the contributions of each transfer to the
lifetime income of children. Thus, for a given distribution of income, any shock altering
the relative marginal return of education will change the fraction of individuals who
will have access to education and, therefore, it will a¤ect inequality, mobility, and
growth. This is a feature that distinguishes our contribution from the one of Galor
and Zeira (1993) since in their model the access to education only depends on the
xed cost of education, whereas in our model investment in education also depends on
preference and scal policy parameters.5 Therefore, in our paper, scal policy will a¤ect
the education decision in a non-trivial way, which makes our framework particularly
suitable to conduct the analysis of the e¤ects of scal policy.
Our model is closely related to those in Galor and Moav (2004 and 2006), who
also consider the two types of intergenerational transfers. However, they assume a joy
of giving motive for intergenerational transfers, where parentsmarginal utility from
physical bequest and from human capital transfers are identical. Therefore, in those
papers the composition of intergenerational transfers relies on an ad-hoc assumption, so
that it does not depend on the relative return of investing in education. Moreover, these
papers assume a convex technology of education, which implies that the composition
of intergenerational transfers does not a¤ect the mobility in earnings. In contrast, we
provide a framework where scal policy a¤ects mobility through the induced change in
the composition of intergenerational transfers of the middle class.
In our setup all individuals are assumed to have the same learning ability so that
the only di¤erence among individuals arises from the predetermined initial income and
education level of their parents. This assumption allows us to focus on the role of the
composition of intergenerational transfers for the distribution of income in the long
run. Allowing for random individually idiosyncratic abilities will deliver a stochastic
version of the deterministic model considered in this paper. In this case the resulting
dynamics and intergenerational mobility would be richer. However, we assume identical,
non-stochastic abilities to make more transparent the mechanism driving the relation
between the composition of intergenerational transfers and the subsequent dynamics of
the economy.
A natural question to ask in our model is how di¤erent scal policies a¤ect the
5 In Galor and Zeira (1993) the access to education also depends on the skill premium when children
are allowed to borrow. This is so because the more protable is the investment in education, the
larger is the number of individuals who will be able to pay back what they have borrowed. However,
if the credit market is shut down for children, as it is assumed in our paper, only the cost of education
determines the decision about the investment in education.
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evolution of both income distribution and mobility, where the latter determines in turn
aggregate income in the long run. In this paper we analyze the e¤ects of the following
government instruments: a pay-as-you-go social security system, a tax on inheritances,
a tax on capital income, a tax on labor income, and a subsidy on education investment.
Note that our analysis is purely positive as we focus exclusively on the e¤ects on
human capital accumulation, inequality, and mobility of traditional macroeconomic
tax instruments. This analysis is performed in Sections 5 and 6. In Section 5, we study
the e¤ects of modifying only one of the aforementioned government instruments and,
among other results, we obtain that raising the tax rate on either inheritance or labor
income results in a larger fraction of non-educated individuals in the total population,
in a smaller individual amount of bequest, and in smaller inequality in initial wealth
between educated and non-educated individuals. Therefore, these taxes have some
equalizing e¤ects but decrease the accumulation of human capital as individuals enjoy
less disposable income to pay for the indivisible cost of education of their children. We
characterize the e¤ects of a pay-as-you-go social security system, which will depend
on whether the economy is dynamically e¢ cient or ine¢ cient. When it is dynamically
e¢ cient, the introduction of a pension system implies a reduction in human capital
accumulation and, hence, an income loss. We also analyze the quite neutral role on
human capital accumulation played by the tax on capital income and the disequalizing
e¤ects triggered by education subsidies. These subsidies only benet the educated
families and hence they increase inequality.
Finally, in Section 6 we study the e¤ects of nancing either government spending or
education subsidies through labor income taxes instead of through inheritance taxes.
We show that this substitution increases human capital and aggregate income, whereas
the e¤ect on income inequality between educated and non-educated individuals depends
on the initial frequency distribution of these two types of individuals.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model of overlapping
generations with altruistic individuals. Section 3 solves the intertemporal choice
problem faced by an individual. In section 4 we describe the dynamics of the joint
distribution of bequest and human capital following a given initial distribution. In
section 5 and 6 we analyze the e¤ects of scal policy on the intergenerational mobility
in human capital and on the stationary distribution of income. Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2 The model
We consider a small open economy populated by overlapping generations of individuals
who live for three periods. There is a continuum of dynasties distributed on the interval
[0; 1]. A new generation of individuals is born in each period within each dynasty. Each
individual has o¤spring at the beginning of the second period of his life and the number
of children per parent is n  1: An agent makes economic decisions only during the
last two periods of his life. In every period, the youngest individuals neither consume
nor work, but they can accumulate human capital by attending formal school. We
assume that individuals can accumulate human capital only during the rst period of
their lives. Individuals work and supply inelastically one unit of labor when they are
adult (second period of life) and are retired when they are old (third period of life).
Individuals are assumed to care about their contribution to the future income of their
children and they can give them two kinds of transfers: physical bequest and education.
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We will use the convention that the generation t is composed of the individuals who
are adult (workers) in period t.
Individuals derive utility from both their own lifetime consumption and their
contribution to the lifetime income of their children. Preferences of an individual
belonging to dynasty i and generation t are represented by the utility function:
U it = ln c
i
t +  lnx
i
t+1 +  ln I
i
t+1; (1)
where  > 0 is the temporal discount factor, the coe¢ cient  > 0 measures the intensity
of altruism, cit and x
i
t+1 are the amounts of consumption in the second and third periods
of life, respectively, and Iit+1 is the after-tax contribution to the future lifetime income
of each of their children. The parental contribution to the income of an individual
belonging to dynasty i and generation t+ 1 is then given by
Iit+1 = (1  w)wt+1it+1 + (1   b)bit+1; (2)
where wt+1 is the wage per e¢ ciency unit of labor at period t + 1; w 2 [0; 1) is the
tax rate on labor income, it+1 is the increase in the number of e¢ ciency units of labor
supplied by an individual belonging to dynasty i and generation t + 1 thanks to the
investment in education made by his parent, bit+1 is the amount of inheritance that an
individual of dynasty i and generation t+ 1 receives from his parent, and  b 2 [0; 1) is
the tax rate on inheritances.
We assume that individuals do not discriminate among their children so that they
make the same contribution Iit+1 for all their direct descendants.
6 Therefore, this equal
treatment assumption, together with the lack of individually idiosyncratic shocks on
preferences, ability or productivity, implies that all the individuals belonging to the
same dynasty i 2 [0; 1] and to the same generation t will be identical in all respects.
However, on the one hand, individuals belonging to the same dynasty but di¤erent
generation could di¤er due to the di¤erent transfers they receive. On the other hand,
individuals belonging to the same generation but di¤erent dynasty will also di¤er in the
amount of transfers they receive if the initial endowments of their respective dynasties
are not identical.
The assumption that individuals derive utility from their contribution to the future
lifetime income of their children with independency of whether this contribution takes
the form of a direct transfer or of an education investment is consistent with the
formulation of altruism defended in Becker and Tomes (1986). It seems reasonable
in our economy to modify the pure joy of givingmotive, where individuals receive
direct utility from the act of giving, by not considering only the total expenditure in
children as a source of felicity. We propose that, instead of the parentsexpenditure, it
is the income received by the direct descendents what matters for parental felicity. That
received income arises indirectly from the after-tax increase in wages due to the higher
individual productivity of educated workers and directly from the after-tax physical
inheritance. Our notion of altruism lies thus between the joy-of-givingmotive and
family altruism, where individualsfelicity depends on the disposable income of their
children.7
Let eit denote the income that the adult individual of dynasty i and generation t
devotes to nance the education of each of their children. We assume that the level
6The altruism parameter  can thus be rewritten as  = n^; where ^ would denote the pure
altruism factor per descendant.
7See Michel et al. (2006) for a comparison between di¤erent forms of altruism.
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of human capital hit+1 of an adult individual belonging to dynasty i and generation
t + 1 is entirely determined by his parents investment eit in his education. Moreover,
we consider a simple form of technological indivisibility in the production of human
capital. In particular, the human capital level of an individual can take two values
depending on whether his parent investment in his education is below or above the
xed cost of education . Thus, the level of human capital at period t+ 1 of an adult
individual belonging to dynasty i who is born at period t is given by the following
equation:
hit+1 = 1 +
i
t+1; (3)
with
it+1 =
8<:
0 if eit < 
" if eit  ;
where " > 0 and  > 0. Obviously, the optimal investment in education for the
individuals who want to have non-educated children (with hit+1 = 1) is e
i
t = 0; whereas
those individuals who want educated children (with hit+1 = 1 + ") will choose e
i
t = :
The number of e¢ ciency units of labor supplied by an individual belonging to dynasty
i and generation t is equal to his level hit of human capital.
There is a single commodity that can be devoted to either consumption or
investment, and the investment can be either in physical or in human capital. Adult
individuals distribute their income, which is composed of wage earnings plus the
amount inherited from their parents, between consumption, investment in education of
their children, and saving. Thus, the budget constraint faced by an adult individual
belonging to dynasty i and generation t is
(1  w)wthit + (1   b)bit = cit + sit + (1  se)neit + ; (4)
where sit is the amount saved by this individual;  is the lump-sum tax faced by an
adult individual, and se 2 [0; 1) is the subsidy rate on education spending. The left
hand side of (4) is the after tax income of the adult individual under consideration.
When individuals are old, they receive a return on their saving, which is distributed
between consumption and bequest for their children. Therefore, the budget constraint
at period t + 1 of an old individual of dynasty i and generation t (i.e., born at period
t  1) will be
[1 + (1  k)rt+1] sit    = xit+1 + nbit+1; (5)
where rt is the before-tax rate of return on saving at period t; k 2 [0; 1] is the tax rate
on capital income, and  is the lump-sum tax faced by an old individual. The values of
the tax rates and of the amounts of lump sum taxes are assumed to be such that the
smallest possible present value of individual lifetime income is positive,
(1  w)wt     
1 + (1  k)rt+1 > 0:
We also impose the constraint that parents cannot force their children to give them
gifts when they (the parents) are old,
bit+1  0: (6)
Note that negative voluntary bequests will never arise in equilibrium given our
assumption of one-sided altruism (from parents to children).
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Since individual preferences are assumed to be logarithmic, when parents do not
invest in the education of their o¤spring, they leave a strictly positive amount of
bequest. This is a technical implication of the Inada condition as the after-tax
contribution Iit+1 to the future lifetime income of each of their children must be strictly
positive. However, very poor individuals will leave a very small amount of bequest and
obviously they will not invest at all in the education of their children as they cannot
a¤ord the xed cost of education. Moreover, the strict positiveness of the after tax
contribution Iit+1 is also compatible with the existence of parents investing in education
but leaving no physical bequests.
In this economy there is a government that selects the di¤erent tax and subsidy
rates and that spends the corresponding net revenue to nance its own consumption.
The government faces a balanced budget constraint in each period so that it is subject
to the following constraint at period t :
n
264 Z
[0;1]
 
wwth
i
t +  bb
i
t   seneit + 

di
375+ Z
[0;1]
 
krts
i
t 1 + 

di = Gt; (7)
where Gt denotes average government consumption per old individual at period t.
We assume that government consumption is unproductive and does not a¤ect directly
individualswelfare. Since Gt is endogenous, scal policy exhibits income e¤ects at the
individual and aggregate levels.
Let us assume that the good of this economy is produced by means of a production
function displaying constant returns to scale on physical and human capital and that
the stock of physical capital fully depreciates after one period. As rms behave
competitively, they choose the ratio of physical to human capital, such that their
marginal productivity equal the rental rates of both capitals. Since this small open
economy features free mobility of physical capital, the interest rate is exogenously
given at the constant international level r > 0, which under constant returns to scale
determines the value of the ratio of physical to human capital. The value of this ratio
of capitals determines in turn the wage w per e¢ ciency unit of labor in equilibrium.
Thus, rt = r and wt = w for all t:
3 The individual problem
In this section, we will solve the problem that a generic individual belonging to dynasty
i and generation t faces in order to choose the levels of consumption at adult and
old ages and the transfers to his immediate descendants. Note rst that the amount
that an individual receives as inheritance and his level of human capital are the state
variables determining his optimal choice.8 Thus, an individual belonging to dynasty i
and generation t maximizes (1) with respect to

cit; x
i
t+1; e
i
t; b
i
t+1
	
subject to (2), (3),
(4), (5), (6) and the non-negative constraints cit  0 and xit+1  0, by taking as given
the amount bit inherited from his parent and his level h
i
t of human capital as well as
the rental prices for labor and capital: Recall that in this intertemporal maximization
problem, the optimal value of the control variable eit will be either zero or  because
of the functional form adopted by the technology producing human capital. Thus, we
8Human capital is a state variable because the individualseducation was decided and nanced by
their parents.
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will solve the individual problem by following a two-stage procedure: rst, we take the
value of eit as given, and then solve for the amounts of saving s
i
t and bequest b
i
t+1; and
second, we nd the optimal amount of eit given the values of s
i
t and b
i
t+1 obtained in
the previous stage.
We now proceed by presenting the details of the solution procedure. From the rst
order conditions of the individual problem, we obtain in Appendix A the following
optimality conditions:
xit+1 = R(k)c
i
t; (8)
and
 (1   b)
Iit+1
 n(1 + )
R(k)
h
(1  w)whit + (1   b)bit   n(1  se)eit  
nbit+1
R(k)
  

i ; (9)
with

 = +

R(k)
;
where the condition (9) holds with equality if bit+1 > 0; and where R(k) will denote
from now on the after-tax gross rate of return on saving, i.e., R(k) = 1+(1 k)r > 0:
Equation (8) yields the optimal allocation of consumption along the lifetime of an
individual belonging to dynasty i and generation t: Equation (9) characterizes the
optimal amount of bequest. This condition tells us that, when the bequest bit+1 is
positive, the marginal variation in the utility of parents arising from a larger amount of
bequest must be equal to zero. On the one hand, the right hand side of this equation is
the utility loss experienced by the individual from the decrease in his lifetime income
devoted to own consumption due to a marginal increase in the amount of bequest left to
their children. On the other hand, the left hand side of (9) is the utility gain obtained
by the individual from the marginal contribution of his bequest to the future lifetime
income of their children.
Combining (8) with the budget constraints (4) and (5), we can derive the amount
sit of saving as a function of the amount of intergenerational transfers. Thus, we obtain
the following expression:
sit =
1
(1 + )



(1  w)whit + (1   b)bit   n(1  se)eit   

+
nbit+1 + 
R(k)

: (10)
Moreover, from (9) we can also compute the optimal amount of bequest that parents
leave to their children when the constraint (6) is not binding, i.e., when bit+1 > 0:
By taking the condition (9) with equality, we directly obtain bit+1 as a function of the
investment in the education of children eit and of the endowments b
i
t and h
i
t, i.e.,
bit+1  B(bit; hit; eit)
=


n (1 + + )

R(k)

(1  w)whit + (1   b)bit   (1  se)neit   


 

n(1 + )(1  w)
(1   b)

wit+1

: (11)
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In the second stage of our solution procedure we will choose the investment in
education eit that solves the individuals problem. Since the investment in education is
indivisible, individuals must actually decide whether they invest  units of income or
do not invest at all. Observe that this decision is subject to the following restrictions.
First, a positive investment in education for individuals with low levels of income may
imply a negative optimal amount of bequest, which is not allowed in our economy by
assumption. In this case, individuals will not invest in the education of their children.
Therefore, the investment in education will be possible only if the individualsincome
is su¢ ciently large so that this investment does not force individuals to leave a negative
bequest. Second, if the amount bit+1 of bequest is positive when the individual invests
 units of income in the education of their children, we have to check that this amount
 is in fact the optimal amount eit of investment in education. We next analyze these
two issues separately.
3.1 Optimal investment in education
Let us rst assume that the individual has a su¢ ciently large level of income so that
the optimal amount bit+1 of bequest is positive even when he decides to invest in the
education of his children. We will now analyze whether to invest in education is an
optimal decision in this case. In Appendix A we obtain that the optimal levels cit and
xit+1 of consumption are given by
cit =

n
 (1   b)R (k)

Iit+1; (12)
xit+1 =

n
 (1   b)

Iit+1; (13)
when (6) is not binding, i.e., when bit+1 > 0. Observe that conditions (12) and (13)
yield the optimal levels cit and x
i
t+1 as increasing functions of I
i
t+1: Therefore, the
choice of education investment that maximizes the utility (1) at period t is the one that
maximizes the contribution of parents to the future income of their children, Iit+1: Since
the investment in education is indivisible, individuals must actually decide whether they
invest  units of income or do not invest at all. An individual will be willing to invest in
the education of their children if and only if this action increases the after-tax lifetime
income of their o¤spring. Thus, in order to nd the optimal education decision we must
compare the benet of investing in education with the associated opportunity cost.
Note that an adult individual at period t can either invest the amount  in the
education of his children or save this amount in order to leave a larger bequest in the
next period. On the one hand, if he decides to invest in the education of their o¤spring,
he must spend (1   se) units of income per child because  is the cost of education
and the government subsidizes the investment in education at the rate se: We obtain
from (3) that this investment in education raises the after-tax lifetime income of each
child by (1   w)w" units. On the other hand, if that individual decides to save the
amount (1 se) in order to make a physical transfer to his children in the next period,
then the after-tax lifetime income of the latter will increase by (1   b)(1  se)R(k)
units since R(k) is the after-tax return on saving. Therefore, an individual born at
t  1 would like to invest in the education of his children at period t if and only if the
following condition holds:
(1  w)w" > (1   b)(1  se)R(k): (14)
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From the previous equation we see that the optimality of investing in education does
not depend on the individuals choices, but on the aggregate variables of the economy.
We also observe that the optimality of investing in the education of children depends
on scal policy. From condition (14), we directly obtain that the inheritance tax,
the capital income tax and the education subsidy raise the willingness of individuals
to invest in the education of their direct descendants, whereas the labor income tax
reduces this willingness.
When the inequality in condition (14) is reversed, individuals adopt the corner
solution eit = 0: From now on we will assume that condition (14) holds. Under this
condition individuals will invest in the education of their o¤spring if they can a¤ord the
minimum after-tax cost of education given by (1  se): Note however that, even when
condition (14) holds, individuals will not invest in the education of their children if this
investment gives raise to a negative optimal amount of bequest. In the next subsection
we derive the levels of income above which individuals invest in the education of their
direct descendants.
3.2 Human capital policy
We are going to characterize the initial values of inheritance and human capital for
which individuals decide to invest in their children education. Let us consider a
generic marginal individual who has received the inheritance b1, has the level ht of
human capital, invests in his children human capital and for whom the non-negativity
constraint on bequests is just binding. The rst order condition with respect to bequests
(9) for this individual is
 (1   b)
(1  w)w" =
n(1 + )
R(k) [(1  w)wht + (1   b)b1   n(1  se)  
] (15)
so that
b1 =
1
1   b

(1  se)n+ (1  w)w

n (1 + ) "
(1   b)R(k)   ht

+


:
Note that, if the inheritance bt that this individual receives becomes larger than b1
(bt > b1), then he will leave strictly positive bequests (bt+1 > 0): If this marginal
individual receives a bequest bt slightly smaller than b1 and decides not to invest in their
children education (et = 0); then the right hand side (RHS) of (15) changes marginally,
since the bequest left will become now approximately equal to the capitalization of his
previous expenditure in education,
bt+1  (1  se)R(k);
or, equivalently,
nbt+1
R(k)
 n(1  se):
However, the left hand side (LHS) of (15) will increase non-marginally since
(1   b)
It+1
 (1   b)
(1   b)bt+1 =

(1  se)R(k) >
 (1   b)
(1  w)w"; (16)
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where the inequality comes from (14). Combining (15) and (16) we get
(1   b)
It+1
>
n(1 + )
R(k) [(1  w)wht + (1   b)bt   n(1  se)  
]
 n(1 + )
R(k)

(1  w)wht + (1   b)bt   nbt+1
R(k)
  

 ;
so that the optimality condition on bequests (9) is violated. Therefore, it is not optimal
for individuals getting the amount b1 of inheritance to withdraw their investment in
education when they face a marginal decrease in his inheritance.
Note that, if bt becomes marginally smaller than b1 and the individual keeps
investing in education and leaves no bequest, then equation (15) implies that
(1   b)
(1  w)w" <
n(1 + )
R(k) [(1  w)wht + (1   b)bt   n(1  se)  
] ;
so that the original optimality condition on bequests (9) is satised since bt+1 = 0.
Therefore, there is an interval of inheritances
 
b0; b1

for which eit =  and bt+1 = 0:
Let us compute the threshold value b0 below which individuals do not invest in
education. For this level b0 of inheritance an individual is indi¤erent between leaving
only bequest or making all the transfers in the form of education and leaving no bequest.
Note that, in case of leaving only bequest, its amount is equal to the capitalized cost
of education, bt+1 = (1   se)R(k); so that the optimality condition on bequests (9)
for this individual becomes

(1  se)R(k)| {z }
(1 b)
(1 b)bt+1
=
n(1 + )
R(k) [(1  w)wht + (1   b)b0   n(1  se)  
] : (17)
Then,
b0 =
1
1   b

n (1 + + ) (1  se)

  (1  w)wht +


: (18)
It is then obvious from (14) that b1 > b0: Observe also that the di¤erence between these
two thresholds depends on how large is the contribution of investing in education to
the o¤springs lifetime income relative to the contribution of leaving the xed cost of
education as a bequest. Any real shock or any variation in scal policy altering this
relative contribution will change the mass of individuals who have access to education.
This is in stark contrast with the related previous literature, where the parents derive
utility not from their contribution to their descendantsincome, but directly from the
size of the intergenerational transfer (see, Galor and Zeira, 1993). In fact, this literature
obtains that the transfer is a strictly monotonic increasing function of parentswealth.
However, this is not the case in our model because those individuals who have received
an inheritance between b0 and b1 give the same transfer to their children: they invest
the amount (1  se) in education and leave no bequest.
Note that the values b0 and b1 vary depending on whether the individual who has
received these amounts of inheritance is educated or not: Thus, let us dene bbj = bj
when ht = 1 + " and ebj = bj when ht = 1; j = 0; 1: Moreover, we immediately obtain
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that ebj > bbj ; for j = 0; 1. Since the labor income of educated individuals is larger
than that of non-educated, the threshold amount of inheritance above which parents
are willing to pay for the education of their children is smaller for educated parents.
As we have just argued, the previous threshold values eb0 and bb0 drive the dynamics
of the human capital level within each dynasty. In particular, the dynamics of human
capital inside a dynasty is given by the following dynamic equation:
hit+1 =
8<:
1 if either hit = 1 and 0  bit < eb0 or hit = 1 + " and 0  bit < bb0;
1 + " if either hit = 1 and b
i
t  eb0 or hit = 1 + " and bit  bb0: (19)
In our economy, when individuals do not invest in the education of their o¤spring,
they always leave a strictly positive amount of bequest. This follows from the fact
that the utility function (1) satises the Inada condition at origin with respect to the
parents contribution to the lifetime income of their children Iit+1; that is, the marginal
utility with respect to Iit+1 goes to innity when this contribution tends to zero.
From the threshold levels
eb0;bb0;eb1;bb1 of bequest dened in this section and
equation (11), we get the following equation characterizing the dynamics of bequests
within a dynasty:
bit+1 =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if either hit = 1 and eb0  bit < eb1 or hit = 1 + " andbb0  bit < bb1;
B1(bit) if h
i
t = 1 and 0  bit < eb0;
B2(bit) if h
i
t = 1 and b
i
t >
eb1;
B3(bit) if h
i
t = 1 + " and 0  bit < bb0;
B4(bit) if h
i
t = 1 + " and b
i
t >
bb1;
(20)
where the expressionsB1(bit)  B
 
bit; 1; 0

; B2(bit)  B
 
bit; 1; 

; B3(bit)  B
 
bit; 1 + "; 0

;
and B4(bit)  B
 
bit; 1 + "; 

are given in (11).
The dynamic equations (19) and (20) fully describe the policy functions for human
capital and bequest, respectively, within a dynasty when condition (14) holds. In other
words, these two equations drive the amount of human capital and bequest for the next
cohort of the dynasty given the human capital and bequest of the present cohort.
4 The dynamics of dynastic income
In this section we study the dynamics of the joint distribution of bequest and human
capital. Under our assumptions, the evolution of these two variables is governed by
the dynamic equations (19) and (20). Since we have considered a small open economy,
the evolution of each dynasty does not depend on the aggregate distribution. Thus, in
this section we analyze the evolution of bequest and human capital for a given dynasty
along time. Individuals within a cohort di¤er in two respects: rst, individuals have
di¤erent levels of income in their second period of life since they have received di¤erent
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transfers form their parents; and, second, individuals also di¤er in the composition of
income due to the di¤erent composition of the transfers received from their parents.
Thus, the amount that a dynasty initially receives as inheritance and the initial level
of human capital fully drive the entire posterior path of bequest, human capital, and
income.
4.1 Stationary distribution of income
We will now characterize the stationary distribution of bequest and human capital. For
that purpose, we will prove that the dynamic system composed of equations (19) and
(20) has at most two stationary solutions. We will see that there are three candidates
for these steady states: a corner solution, where the amount of bequest is zero; and two
interior (or strictly positive) solutions where the amount of bequests are given by the
two possible xed points of (20), which we will denote by b1 and b2: The point b1 is a
xed point of B1(bit); whereas b
2 is a xed point of B4(bit): Thus, we get from (11) that
b1 =
R(k) [(1  w)w   
]
n (1 + + )  R(k) (1   b) ; (21)
and
b2 =
R(k)
h
(1  w)w (1 + ")  (1  se)n  n(1+)(1 w)w"R(k)(1 b)   

i
n (1 + + )  R(k) (1   b) : (22)
Obviously, a necessary condition for an amount of bequest being an interior
steady state is that an educated (non-educated) parent who has received this level
of inheritance does (not) actually invest in the education of their children. We will
see next that the xed points of the functions B2(bit) and B
3(bit) cannot be stationary
values of bequest. In order to prove that a xed point b of B2(bit) is not a steady state
for bequest, let us assume that bit = b > eb0 and hit = 1: As follows from (19) and
(20), this individual leaves a bequest per capita equal to bit+1 = B
2(b) = b and invests
in the education of their children so that hit+1 = 1 + ": Thus, a son of the previous
individual will enjoy an endowment vector
 
hit+1; b
i
t+1

equal to
 
1 + ";b

so that he
will also invest in the education of their children and will leave them a bequest equal
to bit+2 = B
4
 
b
 6= b:9 This proves that the xed point of B2(bit) is not a steady state
because it is not a rest point of the dynamic equation (19).
We can follow similar arguments to prove that a xed point b of B3(bit) cannot be a
steady state. For this purpose, assume that bit = b < bb0 and hit = 1+ ": As follows from
(19) and (20), this individual leaves a bequest per capita equal to bit+1 = B
3(b) = b:
However, he does not invest in the education of their children so that hit+1 = 1: Thus, a
son of the previous individual will enjoy an endowment (hit+1; b
i
t+1) equal to
 
1;b

and,
thus, he will not invest either in the education of their children and will leave them a
bequest equal to bit+2 = B
1(b) 6= b:10 This proves in turn that the xed point of B3(bit)
is not a rest point of the dynamic equation (19).
As a summary, we conclude that mobility in human capital across generations
prevents the xed points of B2(bit) and B
3(bit) from being steady states for bequest.
However, by the same reason, the xed points of B1(bit) and B
4(bit)may be steady states.
The amount b1 of bequest is stationary because those non-educated individuals who
9As b > eb0 and eb0 > bb0 then b > bb0; which together with ht+1 = 1 + " implies that bit+2 = B4  b :
10As b < bb and eb > bb then b < eb; which together with ht+1 = 1 implies that bit+2 = B1  b :
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have received this level of inheritance do not invest in the education of their children,
whereas b2 is a stationary amount of bequest since the educated individuals who have
received this level of inheritance do nance the education of their o¤spring.
Observe that b1 can be either smaller or larger than b2. In the rst case the educated
individuals leave a larger amount of bequest to their children than the non-educated,
whereas the opposite is true in the second case. By using (21) and (22), we obtain that
b1 < b2 if and only if
(1  w)w"  (1  se)n  n (1 + ) (1  w)w"
 (1   b)R (k) > 0: (23)
The left-hand side of (23) collects the three forces driving the relationship between b1
and b2: This relationship depends rst on how large is the labor income of educated
parents with respect to the income of non-educated parents (the education premium ").
Second, the education cost  reduces the amount of bequest that the parents investing
in education are willing to leave to their children. Finally, the third term shows that
the larger is the contribution of education to the labor income of children, the smaller is
the amount of bequest that educated parents must leave to achieve the optimal amount
of the contribution to the future income of their children. Note that in order to satisfy
condition (23) we must have
n (1 + )
 (1   b)R (k) < 1: (24)
If the previous inequality holds, then condition (23) is fullled whenever the school
premium " is su¢ ciently large relative to the indivisible cost  of education. In this
case educated parents enjoy enough income to provide education to their children and
endow them with a large amount of initial wealth. However, non-educated parents
neither invest in their childrens education nor leave a large amount of bequest. Note
in this respect that several empirical studies provide evidence supporting the existence
of a large education premium (see, e.g., Bound and Johnson, 1992; or Barro and Lee,
2001), and document a dramatic increase in this premium from the middle of the past
century (see, e.g., Autor et al., 1998). For instance, Barro and Lee (2001) estimate
that the wage of individuals who have completed the higher level of education relative
to those with an incomplete primary level is around 2:46:
In order to simplify the exposition and keep the length of the paper within a
reasonable bound, we will only analyze the dynamics of the more empirically plausible
case where b1 < b2. In this respect Nordblom and Ohlsson (2011) estimate that the
education level of parents in Sweden increases the probability that they transfer both
human and physical capital to their children. That is, intergenerational transfers of
human capital and physical wealth are complements in equilibrium. Therefore, we will
assume that (23) holds from now on.11
We are interested in those parameter congurations for which the two interior
steady states for bequest b1 and b2 exist and are locally stable. In this case, the
economy exhibits heterogeneity among individuals at the stationary distribution and,
11The analysis of the case with b
1
> b
2
becomes just a mechanical exercise that replicates the same
arguments that we will use in the rest of the paper for the case under consideration. In this case (i.e.,
when (23) does not hold), we must also impose that B4(0) > 0 to ensure the existence of a two-point
interior stationary distribution.
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thus, we can analyze how the initial composition of the intergenerational transfers and
the scal policy parameters a¤ect income inequality and human capital mobility. In
order to establish the existence and local stability of b1 and b2, we must impose some
assumptions on the fundamentals of our economy. In particular, the existence and local
stability of the stationary amounts of bequest depend on whether the non-negative
constraint on bequests (6) is binding or not.
First, the existence of two interior and locally stable xed points b1 and b2 requires
the functions Bj(bit) in (20) to satisfy B
1(0) > 0 and B4(0) > 0 and to exhibit a slope
smaller than one for all j = 1; 2; 3; 4. On the one hand, as was pointed in the previous
section, the Inada condition of the utility function (1) with respect to Iit+1 ensures that
B1(bit) > 0 for all b
i
t  0: Moreover, the condition (23) ensures that B4(bit) > B1(bit)
for all bit  0 so that, in this case, it is also true that B4(0) > 0 and, hence, bb1 < 0:
On the other hand, given these properties, interior xed points exist if and only if the
functions Bj(bit) have slope smaller than one. This property of B
j(bit) holds under the
following condition:
(1   b)R(k)
n(1 + + )
< 1; (25)
which also ensures the local stability of the interior steady states b1 and b2. The previous
condition imposes the standard upper bound on the the return from capital so as to
prevent the size of bequests within a dynasty to grow unboundedly. Combining (25)
and (24) we obtain the following restriction on the net of taxes gross rate of return:
n (1 + )
(1   b) < R(k) <
n(1 + + )
(1   b) : (26)
Second, since B4(0) > 0 and condition (25) holds, the interior steady state b2 exists.
However, the existence of the interior steady state b1 requires that
b1  eb0: (27)
If (27) does not hold, the amount b1 of bequest could not be a steady state because
the function B1(bit) does not characterize the dynamics of bequest left by non-educated
individuals who have received an inheritance larger than eb0: Note that evaluating (18)
for hit = 1 we obtain
eb0 = 1
1   b

n (1 + + ) (1  se)

  (1  w)w +


: (28)
Therefore, given the expressions for eb0 and b1 in (28) and (21), respectively, condition
(27) ends up being just the following condition on the fundamentals of the economy:
w  1
(1  w)

n(1 + + )

  (1   b)R(k)

(1  se)+


: (29)
Note that, if 
  0, then the right hand side of the previous inequality is strictly
positive if (25) holds. Therefore, (27) is fullled whenever the wage w of non-educated
individuals is su¢ ciently small so that it does not enable them to invest in education. If
the previous upper bound on w were not met, then a dynasty initially composed of non-
educated individuals will end up investing in education as the amount of inheritance
will eventually become larger than the threshold value eb0:
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From now on we will also assume that the conditions (23), (25), and (29) hold. It is
important to mention that these three conditions are simultaneously met when the value
of R(k) satises the bounds given in (26), the wage w per e¢ ciency unit (or wage paid
to non-educated workers) is su¢ ciently low (see (29)) and the school premium " relative
to the education cost  is su¢ ciently high (see (23)). Note that the latter condition
allows the economy to fulll the maintained assumption (14). When these conditions
are met, our economy converges to a two-point distribution with appealing empirical
properties.12 Under this stationary distribution, some dynasties leave a positive bequest
to each of their children equal to b1 and do not invest in their education, whereas other
dynasties do invest in the education of their children and leave a larger bequest per
capita equal to b2: As we have already mentioned, this property of the stationary
distribution agrees with the empirical evidence provided by Nordblom and Ohlsson
(2011). The case under consideration is thus depicted in Figure 1, which plots the
relationship between the bequest left to children and the inheritance received from
parents given by the dynamic equation (20). Note that this relationship is piecewise
linear.
[Insert Figure 1]
Since the initial distribution of bequest and human capital determines both the
stationary income distribution and the intergenerational mobility in human capital,
we will characterize in the following subsection the entire path of bequest and human
capital for all types of dynasties when the economy converges to the aforementioned
two-point distribution. We will use this analysis to study in the next sections the
impact of scal policy in the distribution dynamics for an arbitrary initial distribution.
4.2 Dynamic analysis
In this subsection we analyze the dynamics of an economy that converges to the two-
point distribution having the steady-state values b1 and b2: As was shown in the
previous subsection, this occurs when the conditions (23), (25), and (29) hold. We
will next analyze how the initial distribution of bequest and human capital determines
the number of dynasties converging to a situation with hit = 1 and b
i
t =
b1 and those
converging to another with hit = 1 + " and b
i
t =
b2:
We rst observe that those dynasties whose members have the initial human capital
hit = 1 and who have received an inheritance b
i
t smaller than eb0 converge to a steady
state given by hi = 1 and bi = b1, whereas all the dynasties with members having
the initial human capital hit = 1 + " converge to a steady state given by h
i = 1 + "
and bi = b2: This conclusion directly follows from the dynamics of human capital and
bequest described by (19) and (20), and after using condition (25) ensuring the local
stability of the steady states b1 and b2. On the one hand, the members of a dynasty
with hit = 1 and b
i
t smaller than eb0 do not invest in the education of their children and
leave a non-negative amount bit+1 of bequest satisfying b
i
t+1 <
eb0: On the other hand,
the members of a dynasty with a level hit = 1+ " of human capital always invest in the
education of their children because bb0 < 0: Condition (25) ensures that the bequests of
the former and the latter dynasties will converge to b1 and b2, respectively.
The members of the dynasties with hit = 1 and b
i
t larger than eb0 decide to nance
the education of their children as dictated by equation (19). Moreover, the amount
12 In Appendix B we present all possible congurations of the stationary distribution when at least
one of the two conditions (25) and (27) does not hold.
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bit+1 = B
2(bit) of bequest that they leave is non-negative so that the children of those
individuals will then decide to leave a bequest per capita equal to bit+2 = B
4(bit+1).
The dynasty will thus converge to the steady state given by hi = 1 + " and bi = b2.
Therefore, the threshold value eb0 of bequest drives the dynamics of the initially non-
educated dynasties and, in particular, their upward mobility in terms of human capital.
The non-educated dynasties will converge to the steady state associated with hi = 1+"
and bi = b2 if their members are initially endowed with an inheritance bit larger thaneb0, whereas these non-educated dynasties with an inheritance bit smaller than eb0 will
converge to the steady state given by hi = 1 and bi = b1: We can thus summarize the
dynamic behavior of the economy considered in this subsection as follows:
Proposition 1 . The dynasties with an initial level hi0 = 1 of human capital will
converge: (i) to the steady state with hi = 1 and bi = b1 if their initial level bi0 of
inheritance is such that bi0 < eb0; and (ii) to the steady state with hi = 1+ " and bi = b2
if bi0 > eb0: The dynasties with an initial level hi0 = 1 + " of human capital will always
converge to the steady state with hi = 1 + " and bi = b2:
We have thus shown how the initial distribution of bequest and human capital
determines the stationary distribution of these variables and thus the stationary
distribution of income. In particular, our model predicts that the propensity to invest
in the education of children depends positively on the education level of parents. With
respect to human capital mobility, we observe that only the non-educated dynasties
may experience intergenerational mobility so that only upward mobility is possible
in our economy. In particular, the dynasties with an initial level hi0 = 1 of human
capital educate their children in the rst period if bi0 > eb0, and then they remain as
educated dynasties forever. Therefore, for these dynasties the human capital adjusts
instantaneously to the level 1 + " and the amount of bequest converge monotonously
along time to the steady state b2: Moreover, the threshold eb0 in (28) contains all the
information about the determinants of this one-shot upward mobility.
5 E¤ects of scal policy on the stationary distribution
In this section we will analyze how scal policy a¤ects the stationary distribution
towards which an economy converges given an initial distribution. We will assume
a parametric conguration ensuring that the economy converges to the empirically
plausible two-point distribution considered in Subsection 4.2. Given an initial
distribution of bequest and human capital, we will study how non-anticipated
permanent marginal shocks on the scal parameters alter this stationary distribution.
In particular, we will develop balanced-budget incidence analyses where government
consumption will accommodate the permanent scal shocks in order to satisfy the
constraint (7).
Fiscal policy can alter the stationary amounts b1 and b2 of bequest and can also
a¤ect the proportion of dynasties converging to each of these steady states by distorting
the intergenerational mobility in human capital. The distance between b1 and b2
provides information on the distribution of income between educated and non-educated
adult individuals due to the di¤erent amounts of inheritance they receive. Obviously,
the e¤ects of scal policy on the distance between b1 and b2 is not a measure of
the e¤ects on income inequality, as these policies also modify the long run relative
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frequencies of the two groups. These relative frequencies are obtained from the long-
run fraction  of individuals who are not educated and do not provide education
to their descendants. This long-run fraction depends on the initial distribution of
inheritance among the non-educated individuals and the initial fraction of non-educated
individuals. Let 0 2 (0; 1) be the initial fraction of non-educated individuals and
assume that inheritances among the non-educated are initially distributed according to
the continuous distribution function F with F (b) = 0 for b < 0 . Therefore, a fraction
F
eb0 of non-educated individuals will not educate their children. This implies that a
fraction  = 0F
eb0 of individuals will not be educated in the long run. Note that
 depends on the threshold value eb0 and, thus, is an endogenous variable that could
be modied by scal policy. The e¤ect of scal policies on intergenerational upward
mobility in human capital is then given by their impact on the threshold amount eb0
of bequest. A smaller value of eb0 means that the set of initial amounts of bequest for
which non-educated dynasties end up being educated becomes larger. Moreover, as
the wage w and the skill premium " are both exogenous, an increase in the number of
educated dynasties also increases the aggregate income of the economy. Therefore, the
smaller is the value of eb0; the easier is intergenerational upward mobility and the larger
is aggregate income.13
The standard measure of income inequality is the Gini index, which in our two-point
distribution is dened as
  = 1  q
n

;
where qn is the fraction of total income held by non-educated individuals,
qn =
zn
zn + (1  ) ze ;
zn is the net present income of non-educated individuals and ze is the net present
income of educated individuals (see Checchi and García-Peñalosa, 2004). In order to
perform the analysis of the e¤ects of scal policy it is going to be convenient to rewrite
the Gini index as
  = 1  1
1 +M
;
where M = (1  ) and
 =
ze   zn
zn
=


1 + + 
0@"  (1 b)R(k)(1 se)(1 w)w
1  
(1 w)w
1A > 0: (30)
The Gini index is thus positively related with the variable M which, therefore,
provides also a measure of income inequality. If M = 0 the distribution exhibits
perfect equality and if M =1 the distribution is characterized by extreme inequality.
This measure of income inequality depends on two variables: the long-run fraction of
educated individuals, 1  ; and the relative di¤erence  of income between educated
and non-educated individuals, which is given by :14 Note that both variables depend
13Fscal policy can also a¤ect the threshold level bb0. However, since we will only consider marginal
shocks in scal policy, we can maintain the assumption that this threshold level remains negative after
the scal shocks.
14Condition (14) implies that the numerator of  is positive and b1 > 0 implies that the denominator
is also positive.
18
on scal policy parameters. Let  i be a given tax rate. Then, the e¤ects of increasing
this tax on our measure of income inequality are
@M
@ i
=  

 eb0

@eb0
@ i
+ (1  ) @
@ i
; (31)
where
 =
F 0
eb0eb0
F
eb0 > 0
is the elasticity of the distribution function. As follows from this expression, the e¤ects
of scal policy on income inequality will be ambiguous when taxes increase (reduce)
the proportion of educated individuals but reduce (increase) the relative di¤erence
of income between the two groups. In this case, the net e¤ect on income inequality
depends on (i) the shape of the distribution function, measured by its elasticity, and (ii)
the fraction of non-educated individuals. When the distribution function is su¢ ciently
inelastic or the fraction of non-educated individuals is su¢ ciently small, the change
in the fraction of educated individuals will be small and the e¤ects of scal policy
on income inequality will be driven by the change in the relative di¤erence of income
between the two groups of individuals. In contrast, when the distribution function
is su¢ ciently elastic or the fraction of non-educated individuals is su¢ ciently large,
the e¤ects of scal policy will be driven by the change in the fraction of educated
individuals.
We next study separately the e¤ect of each of the tax instruments under
consideration.
5.1 Inheritance taxation
We will rst show that the tax on inheritances reduces the stationary values b1 and b2
of bequest. Di¤erentiating the function (11) with respect to  b we obtain
@B(bit; h
i
t; e
i
t)
@ b
=  

R(k)b
i
t
n(1 + + )
+
(1 + )(1  w)wit+1
(1 + + ) (1   b)2

; (32)
which is clearly negative. Since the values b1 and b2 are xed points of B1(bit) =
B(bit; 1; 0) and B
4(bit) = B(b
i
t; 1 + "; ), respectively, the e¤ects of the inheritance tax
on these stationary solutions immediately follow from (32) and (3). Moreover, the
marginal increase in the value of this tax rate reduces the gap between b1 and b2
because the negative impact of this permanent policy shock on B4(bit) is larger than in
B1(bit) as follows from (32) after substituting the corresponding value of 
i
t+1. Thus,
the increase in the tax rate on inheritances reduces the stationary di¤erences in the
income per capita between educated and non-educated individuals. However, because
of the strong reduction of the income of the non-educated individuals, the increase in
this tax raises the relative di¤erence of income between the two groups of individuals,
@
@ b
=


1 + + 

R(k) (1  se)
(1  w)w   


> 0:
We now analyze the e¤ects of the tax on the threshold amount eb0 of bequest,
which determines the steady state towards which each dynasty converges to. Clearly,
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the value eb0 given in (28) is strictly increasing in the tax  b on inheritances sinceeb0 > 0. Therefore, the tax on inheritances reduces the number of initially non-educated
dynasties converging to the steady state given by hi = 1 + " and bi = b2: As was
expected from the dynamic analysis of the previous section, this tax does not alter the
number of initially educated dynasties converging to the steady state given by hi = 1+"
and bi = b2:
The net e¤ect of this tax on income inequality is ambiguous as this tax increases
the fraction of non-educated individuals and raises the relative di¤erence of income
between the two groups of individuals,. The rst e¤ect reduces income inequality,
whereas the second increases income inequality. The second e¤ect dominates when
either the distribution is inelastic or the value of  is su¢ ciently small. In this case,
an increase in the tax rate on inheritances increases income inequality. Otherwise, an
increase in this tax results in a reduction of income inequality.
The overall e¤ects of inheritance taxation on the stationary distribution can then
be summarized as follows. After an increase in this tax rate, the stationary fraction of
non-educated individuals increases and the amount of bequest becomes smaller in the
long run. This reduction in the amount of bequest is larger for the group of educated
adult individuals (i.e., for the richest people). The aggregate adult income at the steady
state then goes down. Therefore, all these e¤ects of inheritance taxation translate into
a reduction in both aggregate income and human capital accumulation. However, the
nal e¤ect on income inequality is generally ambiguous. Figure 2 presents the change
in the relative frequencies of the stationary distribution of bequests after an increase
in the tax rate on inheritances.
[Insert Figure 2]
Inheritance taxes clearly make physical bequests more costly as an instrument to
increase the lifetime income of children. This explains why an inheritance tax reduces
the amount of bequest that parents leave to their o¤spring. Moreover, this distortion of
the tax on the bequests decision margin also explains why this tax raises the amount
of inheritance that an individual must receive from his parents in order to be willing
to invest in the education of their children. Therefore, an increase in the inheritance
tax ends up being an impediment for upward mobility as the reduction in initial wealth
prevents a larger fraction of individuals from jumping the hurdle associated to the
indivisible cost of education.
5.2 Labor income taxation
To obtain the e¤ects of labor income taxation, we use (11) to get
@B(bit; h
i
t; e
i
t)
@w
=

wR (k)
n(1 + + )
 
n (1 + )it+1
 (1   b)R (k)   h
i
t

: (33)
By using (3), (20) and (24), we immediately get
@B1
@w
< 0 and
@B4
@w
< 0:
Hence, a marginal increase in the rate of the labor income tax reduces the stationary
amounts b1 and b2 of bequest. Moreover, by using condition (23) we also obtain that an
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increase in the rate of the labor income tax pushes the gap between the values b1 and
b2 down. In other words, the labor income taxation reduces the stationary di¤erences
in the income per capita between educated and non-educated individuals. Moreover, if

 is su¢ ciently small, this tax also reduces the relative di¤erence  of income between
the two groups of individuals as follows from using (30),
@
@w
=

w
1 + + 

"
  (1   b)R(k) (1  se)
[(1  w)w   
]2

< 0:
From (28), we get that the threshold value eb0 is strictly increasing in the tax on
labor income. Therefore, the labor income tax decreases the number of initially non-
educated dynasties converging to the steady state given by hi = 1 + " and bi = b2. In
this case, a positive permanent shock in the tax rate lowers the stationary fraction of
population that is educated (hi = 1 + ") and leaves a bequest equal to b2. Figure 2
illustrates also the change in the relative frequencies of the stationary distribution of
bequests after an increase in the tax rate on labor income.
Summing up, an increase in the tax on labor income reduces income inequality
because it increases the fraction of non-educated individuals and reduces the relative
di¤erence  of income between educated and non-educated individuals.
5.3 Capital income taxation
To obtain the e¤ects of capital income taxation, we rst get from (11) that
@B(bit; h
i
t; e
i
t)
@k
=  r

(1  w)whit + (1   b)bit   n(1  se)eit   

n(1 + + )
: (34)
Observe that the expression inside the square parenthesis in the RHS of (34) is the
individuals disposable income at the adult age (see the budget constraint (4)). Hence,
the derivative (34) is negative. Therefore, the tax on capital income reduces the
stationary amounts b1 and b2 of bequest and, moreover, condition (23) implies that
this reduction is larger for the amount b2 of bequest of educated individuals. However,
the increase in this tax raises the relative di¤erence  of income between the two groups
of individuals,
@
@k
=


1 + + 

(1   b) r (1  se)
(1  w)w   


> 0:
We clearly see from (28) that the marginal increase in the tax rate k a¤ects the
threshold amount eb0 of bequest only through its e¤ect in the present value 
 of lump-
sum taxation. An increase in the capital income tax k involves a reduction in R (k),
which in turn increases (decreases) the present value 
 of lump-sum taxes if the lump-
sum tax  paid by old individuals is positive (negative). Therefore, according to (28) an
increase in k results in a larger (smaller) threshold value of eb0 if and only if  > (<)0:
Obviously, if the present value 
 of lump sum taxes increases, individuals will require a
larger transfer from their parents to overcome this reduction in income to maintain their
investment in education. In this case, capital income taxation makes human capital
mobility more di¢ cult.
When old individuals do not pay lump sum taxes, capital income taxation has no
e¤ect on human capital mobility. Clearly, the change in the after tax interest rate
does not trigger any income e¤ect when old individuals do not receive any exogenous
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income. Moreover, we easily see by looking at the optimality condition (17) of the
marginal individual who is indi¤erent between leaving only bequest or making all the
transfers in the form of education and leaving zero bequests that the tax rate k a¤ects
symmetrically both the cost and the prot associated to their transfers. Note that for
this individual the contribution to their descendants lifetime income is equal to the
capitalized cost of education, bt+1 = (1  se)R(k); which appears in the LHS of (17),
whereas the cost n(1   se) of his transfer, which appears in the denominator of the
RHS, takes place when the individual is adult so that it has to be multiplied by R(k)
in order to obtain the cost in terms of consumption when old. Therefore, the resulting
threshold value of eb0 of bequest ends up being independent of the capital return R(k)
provided that  = 0:
When  = 0; the increase in the capital income tax does not modify the fraction
of educated individuals but raises the relative di¤erence  of income between between
the two groups of individuals. Therefore, in this case, the capital income tax increases
income inequality. This apparently surprising result arises because the increase in
this tax reduces the opportunity cost of nancing education and, obviously, this only
benets rich educated individuals.
5.4 Education subsidies
In this subsection, we analyze the e¤ects of a marginal change in the subsidy to
education investment. As before, government spending is adjusted endogenously so
as to keep the government budget constraint balanced. Obviously, this policy can
a¤ect only the bequest left by those individuals who invest in the education of their
children since only those individuals are entitled to receive the subsidy. In particular, an
increase in the subsidy rate raises the disposable income of these individuals and does
not alter their contribution to the lifetime income of their children. Hence, the subsidy
stimulates the willingness of parents to leave bequest, which results in a reduction of
the amount of inheritance that they must receive in order to invest in the education
of their children. This conclusion can directly be proved by using (28) to see that eb0
is strictly decreasing in the subsidy rate se. Observe that a permanent increase in the
subsidy rate raises the stationary fraction of population that is educated (hi = 1 + ")
and leave bequest equal to b2 at the steady state. Moreover, the amount b2 of bequest
left by each educated individual goes up, whereas the amount b1 of bequest left by
non-educated (i.e., the poorest) individuals does not change. Therefore, the aggregate
income of adult individuals rises at the steady state and, moreover, the proportion of
aggregate income enjoyed by poorest adult individuals decreases. This implies that the
relative di¤erence  of income between the two groups raises as it follows from (30),
@
@se
=


1 + + 

(1   b)R(k)
(1  w)w   


> 0:
Figure 3 illustrates the change in the relative frequencies of the stationary distribution
of bequests after an increase in the subsidy rate on education.
[Insert Figure 3]
The increase in the rate of the education subsidy raises income inequality as it
increases both the fraction of educated individuals and the relative di¤erence  of
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income. This e¤ect is not a surprising since this subsidy is given only to the group of
rich educated individuals.
Before closing this subsection, we should note that an increase in the subsidy
to education has an impact qualitatively similar to a reduction in the cost of
education  (see (28)): The parameter  characterizes the technology for human capital
accumulation as it determines the productivity of the education system, which is
obviously a decreasing function of the education cost . Therefore, a more productive
education sector results in a larger upward mobility in human capital as there will be a
larger fraction of population that becomes educated, and in a larger income inequality
between educated and non-educated individuals (see Acemoglu, 2002).
5.5 Social security system
We now analyze the e¤ect of a pay-as-you-go social security system where old
individuals receive lump-sum benets that are nanced by the contributions of adult
individuals. If the contributions of adult individuals take the form of labor income
taxes, the social security system has two distortionary e¤ects on our economy. On the
one hand, since the labor supply in e¢ ciency units is endogenous, the labor income tax
distorts the individual choice as was showed in Subsection 5.2. On the other hand, the
social security system implies an ex-ante intergenerational redistribution from adult to
old individuals. Since we have already studied the distortionary e¤ect of labor income
taxation, we will exclusively focus on the e¤ects of intergenerational redistribution
achieved through lump-sum taxes. To do so, we consider a marginal variation of the
lump-sum tax  satisfying
d
d
=  n; (35)
in order to full the budget constraint (7). Therefore, we will assume that the
government increases the lump-sum tax  paid by the adult individuals, and the
additional revenues are entirely devoted to nance an increase in the lump-sum subsidy
 to the old individuals.
An increase in the lump-sum transfer from adult to old individuals (an increase
in ) does not alter the gap between the stationary amounts b1 and b2 of bequest.
However, the e¤ect of a pay-as-you-go social security system on income distribution
and on intergenerational mobility in human capital depend on whether the economy is
dynamically e¢ cient or ine¢ cient as dened by Cass (1979). In particular, an increase
in  has the following e¤ects:
@
@
=


(1  w)w   


1  n
R (k)

;
and
@eb0
@
=
1
1   b

1  n
R (k)

:
If R (k) > n, the social security program raises the relative di¤erence  of income but
reduces the fraction of educated individuals. In this case, income inequality increases if
the second e¤ect is small, which occurs when the distribution function is inelastic or the
fraction of educated individuals is su¢ ciently small. The opposite e¤ects occur when
R (k) < n: In this case, income inequality increases when the distribution function is
either su¢ ciently elastic or the fraction of educated individuals is su¢ ciently large.
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The social security program distorts the decisions on bequest and education
investment by a¤ecting the marginal utility loss derived from reducing consumption
in order to increase the amount of bequest left to children. In particular, there may
exist a wedge between the returns on saving given by R (k) and the returns of social
security program given by n: Thus, this policy can alter the present value to the lifetime
income that individuals devote to own consumption given the amount of bequest that
they will leave to their children. If R (k) > n; then the social security program reduces
the present value of lifetime income of individuals. Therefore, in this case this policy
reduces the willingness of parents to leave bequest and to invest in the education of
their children. Evidently, the opposite conclusion arises when R (k) < n:
6 Labor income taxes vs. inheritance taxes
We have seen in the previous section that both inheritance and labor income taxes
reduce aggregate income and they may also reduce income inequality. In this section
we discuss which of these two taxes is the best tax instrument in terms of aggregate
income and income inequality. We address this question by comparing the e¤ects
on aggregate income and income inequality of substituting labor income taxes by
inheritance taxes. We consider two di¤erent scal policy scenarios: rst, taxes are used
to nance government spending and, second, they are used to nance an education
subsidy. Since we want to characterize the e¤ects of scal policy on the long-run
equilibrium, we constrain the parameter values of the model in order to guarantee
convergence to the two-point distribution considered in Section 4.2.
Regarding scal policy, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that k =  =  = 0.
Taking into account that the equilibrium converges to a two-point distribution, the
government budget constraint (7) in the long run simplies to
G+ n2 (1  ) se = nw [1 + (1  ) "] w + nb b;
where b = b
1
+ (1  ) b2: We also assume that initially there is no government
spending nor education subsides and that the tax rate on inheritance and labor income
are initially set equal to zero, G = se = w =  b = 0: Then, we will characterize the
e¤ects of introducing scal policy instruments. In order to do so, we totally di¤erentiate
the previous government budget constraint evaluated at G = se = w =  b = 0 to
obtain
dG+ n2 (1  )dse = nw [1 + (1  ) "] dw + nbd b: (36)
This equation shows the relationship between the increases in taxes, government
spending, and subsidies that balance the government budget when scal policy is
introduced. As follows from equation (36), this relationship depends on the value of
: Therefore, the increase in the tax rates needed to accommodate the introduction of
either government spending or education subsidies depends on the long-run fraction
of educated individuals. In the scal policy experiments that we will perform in
this section, taxes are set endogenously to balance the government budget constraint,
whereas in the scal policy experiments in Section 5 government spending endogenously
adjusted to tax shocks. Finally, because of the endogeneity of taxes, the e¤ects of scal
policy on aggregate variables depend on the initial joint distribution of bequest and
education among individuals.
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The aim of this section is to study the e¤ects of scal policies on both aggregate
income and income inequality. The e¤ects on aggregate income are obtained by totally
di¤erentiating (28) and making G = se = w =  b = 0;
deb0 = eb0d b   n (1 + + )

dse + wdw: (37)
Similarly, the e¤ects on income inequality are obtained by totally di¤erentiatingM and
making G = se = w =  b = 0
dM =   eb0 deb0 + (1  ) d; (38)
where deb0 is dened in (37) and
d =


1 + + 

R
w

(d b + dse   dw) : (39)
We will next study the implications of using labor income taxes instead of
inheritance taxes to nance the introduction of either government spending or education
subsidies.
6.1 Introducing government spending
As in the previous section, the introduction of government spending reduces the number
of educated individuals when it is nanced by either inheritance taxes or labor income
taxes. Increasing any of these two taxes reduces the disposable income of parents and
therefore reduces the number of educated families in the long run. This results in a
reduction of both the stock of human capital and aggregate income. The following
proposition shows that this reduction is larger when government spending is nanced
by means of inheritance taxes:
Proposition 2 The marginal introduction of government spending nanced with either
inheritance taxes or labor income taxes decreases aggregate income. This reduction of
aggregate income is smaller if the same marginal introduction of government spending
is nanced with labor income taxes.
The marginal e¤ects of scal policy on education depend on how these policies
a¤ect the income of the marginal individual who is not educated but educates their
descendants. Note that this individual will have a su¢ ciently large amount of bequest to
educate their children, but a low salary. As a consequence, when government spending
is nanced with a tax on inheritances this individual will su¤er a larger reduction
in income than when government spending is nanced with a tax on labor income.
Therefore, the last part of the previous proposition follows as inheritance taxes imply
a larger increase in the threshold value eb0 of bequest.
The introduction of government spending also changes income inequality as the
following proposition shows:
Proposition 3 Let us dene
e = 1
 

"w
R   1

+ 1
2 (0; 1)
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and
 =
1
' () 

"w
R   1

+ 1
2 (0; 1) ;
where  > e: Then,
(a) The marginal introduction of government spending nanced with labor income
taxes reduces income inequality. Moreover, if  > (<) e then the marginal introduction
of government spending nanced with inheritance taxes reduces (increases) income
inequality.
(b) Assume that  > e: If  < (>); then the reduction of income inequality is
larger when the same marginal introduction of government spending is nanced with
labor income taxes (inheritance taxes).
According to the previous proposition, the introduction of government spending
nanced with taxes may reduce income inequality. On the one hand, due to the skill
premium, taxes on labor income reduce more the income of educated individuals than of
non-educated. On the other hand, the e¤ect of inheritance taxes on income inequality is
ambiguous and depends on the long-run frequency of educated individuals. Whether or
not the reduction in income inequality is larger when government spending is nanced
with taxes on labor income or on inheritances will depend on the long-run frequencies of
the two groups. These frequencies determine the corresponding tax bases and, thus, the
increase in the tax rates necessary to nance the marginal introduction of government
spending. It can be proved that the base of the inheritance tax is smaller than the base
of the tax on labor income when the fraction  of non-educated is su¢ ciently small. In
this case, the marginal introduction of government spending requires a larger increase
in  b than in w:
We summarize the results of this section by saying that, for those economies
displaying a low level of government spending and a su¢ ciently large value of  ( > );
the substitution of taxes on labor income for inheritance taxes reduces income inequality
and increases aggregate income by raising the number of educated individuals in the
long run. However, if  <  then substituting inheritance taxes for labor income taxes
implies the classical trade-o¤ between income inequality and aggregate income.
6.2 Introducing education subsidies
In the previous section we have shown that the introduction of subsidies to education
implies larger income inequality and larger aggregate income. The opposite e¤ects may
arise when taxes on inheritances or on labor income are introduced. Therefore, the
e¤ects of the introduction of a subsidy nanced with these taxes are not obvious at
rst glance. We rst characterize the e¤ects on aggregate income of the introduction
of an education subsidy.
Proposition 4 The introduction of an education subsidy nanced with either labor
income taxes or inheritance taxes increases aggregate income. This increase is larger
if the same marginal introduction of the subsidy is nanced with labor income taxes.
The education subsidy reduces the cost of education and, therefore, increases the
number of educated families. Moreover, using labor income taxes instead of inheritance
taxes to nance the education subsidy increases aggregate income. As we showed when
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discussing the introduction of government spending, the intuition for the previous result
is based on the di¤erential e¤ects of these taxes on the income of the marginal non-
educated individual who decides to educate their descendants.
We next present the e¤ects on income inequality between educated and non-
educated individuals of increasing the subsidy to education
Proposition 5 (a) The marginal introduction of an education subsidy nanced with
either labor income taxes or inheritance taxes increases income inequality.
(b) If  > (<), then the increase in income inequality is larger when the same
marginal introduction of an education subsidy is nanced with labor income taxes
(inheritance taxes).
Part (a) of the previous proposition tells us that the marginal introduction of a
subsidy to education increases income inequality. This is a consequence of the fact
that these subsidies only benet educated individuals. Part (b) follows from the same
argument as in Proposition 3, namely, that the fraction  of non-educated individuals
fully determines the corresponding tax bases and thus the required increase in the tax
rates to nance the marginal introduction of the education subsidy.
The introduction of subsidies to education nanced with either labor income taxes
or inheritance taxes implies the typical trade-o¤ between inequality and income. The
substitution of the inheritances tax by the labor income tax implies this trade-o¤ only
when the fraction of non-educated individuals is su¢ ciently large. In contrast, in
societies with a large fraction of educated individuals, this substitution increases income
and reduces income inequality. We have thus shown that the e¤ects of scal policy on
important economic variables may depend on the initial distribution of individuals
between the two groups.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed how the initial distribution and composition of wealth
between bequest and human capital characterize the evolution of both the distribution
of income and the intergenerational mobility in human capital. There are three main
assumptions that give rise to our results. First, the education of individuals can only be
nanced by their parents, who derive satisfaction from their contribution to the lifetime
income of their children with independence of the type of the intergenerational transfers
used for that purpose. Second, we assume that the acquisition of human capital
is indivisible and requires thus a minimum amount of investment. Finally, parents
cannot force children to give them transfers, so that those parents with a su¢ ciently
small income will not invest in the education of their children. Hence, intragenerational
income distribution and intergenerational mobility in human capital are a¤ected by the
percentage of individuals who inherited a su¢ ciently large amount of physical wealth
to enable them to invest in the education of their o¤spring. Furthermore, the minimum
amount of inheritance required by educated parents to give education to their children
di¤ers from the minimum amount for non-educated parents.
From our results we can conclude that the cross-country di¤erences in the
composition of intergenerational transfers, income inequality, and mobility are driven
by (i) the initial distribution of both wealth and human capital; (ii) the correlation
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between these two initial distributions; (iii) di¤erences in the process of human capital
accumulation; and (iv) di¤erences in the scal policy set by the governments.
We have shown how di¤erent scal instruments a¤ect both aggregate income and
income inequality through two di¤erent policy exercises. In Section 5, we have analyzed
the e¤ects of a scal policy instrument when government spending accommodates any
scal shock to satisfy the government budget constraint. We show that increasing
the tax rate on inheritances or on labor income reduces human capital accumulation,
raising the rate of the education subsidy increases human capital accumulation, and
social security increases human capital accumulation if and only if the economy is
dynamically ine¢ cient. Regarding the e¤ects on income inequality, an increase in
labor income taxes reduces inequality, whereas an increase in capital income taxes or
education subsidies increase inequality. The e¤ects of inheritances taxes and social
security on income inequality depend on the initial fraction of educated individuals.
In Section 6 we have analyzed the e¤ects of using labor income taxes instead
of inheritance taxes to nance either government spending or education subsidies.
This substitution increases human capital accumulation and, hence, aggregate income
increases. In contrast, the e¤ects of this substitution on income inequality depend on
the initial fraction of non-educated individuals. In societies with an initially low fraction
of non-educated individuals using labor income taxes instead of inheritances taxes
increases income and reduces inequality. In contrast, in societies with an initially large
fraction on non-educated individuals the substitution between these two taxes necessary
implies the traditional trade-o¤ between aggregate income and income inequality.
As we have mentioned in the introduction a natural extension of our analysis would
be the introduction of idiosyncratic, stochastic individual abilities so as to obtain
random mobility between two consecutive generations. However, in this generalized
setup the composition of initial transfers will play a similar role as in our deterministic
model.
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Appendix
A Optimality conditions of the individual problem
We derive in this appendix the optimal conditions on cit; x
i
t; s
i
t and b
i
t+1. To this end we
take the value of eit as given. First, by combining (4) and (5) we obtain the following
intertemporal budget constraint:
(1  w)wthit + (1   b)bit   
 = cit + (1  se)neit +
xit+1 + nb
i
t+1
R (k)
: (A.1)
Second, consider the problem consisting on maximizing (1) with respect to

cit; x
i
t+1; b
i
t+1
	
subject to (A.1) and (6). Denote by  the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the
constraint (A.1). The rst order conditions of the previous problem are given by
cit =
1
 
; (A.2)
xit+1 =
R (k)
 
; (A.3)
and
 (1   b)
Iit+1
 n 
R (k)
: (A.4)
By combining (A.2) and (A.3), we directly get (8). Moreover, from (A.2) and (A.3) we
obtain
cit +
xit+1
R (k)
=
1 + 
 
: (A.5)
Combining (A.1), (A.4), and (A.5) we can easily derive condition (9). Finally, after
solving for  in condition (A.4) when it holds with equality and substituting the result
in (A.2) and (A.3), we obtain conditions (12) and (13).
B Di¤erent congurations of the stationary distribution
Under the maintained condition (23), the conditions (25) and (29) determine the
conguration of the stationary distribution of physical bequest and human capital.
In particular, the following congurations of the stationary distribution can emerge in
our economy:
1. When condition (25) does not hold, then no stable stationary distribution exists.
2. When condition (25) holds, the economy converges to a degenerate distribution if
condition (29) is not satised. In this case, the xed point b2 is the unique interior
steady-state. In this steady-state all the dynasties invest in their childrens
education and leave an amount of bequest equal to b2:
3. Finally, when the conditions (25) and (29) hold, then the economy converges to
a two-point distribution where some dynasties leave a bequest per children equal
to b1 and do not invest in their education, whereas the rest of dynasties do invest
in the education of their children and leave a bequest per capita equal to b2:
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C Proofs of the Propositions of Section 6
Proof of Proposition 2. We assume that dse = 0 and we use (36) and (37) to obtain
deb0
dG

dw=0
=
eb0
nb
> 0
and
deb0
dG

db=0
=
1
n [1 + (1  ) "] > 0:
The increase in eb0 is larger when government spending is nanced with inheritance
taxes if the following inequality holds:
deb0
dG

dw=0
>
deb0
dG

db=0
:
This inequality simplies to eb0 [1 + (1  ) "] > b: (40)
To prove that (40) holds, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 6 The following inequalities hold:
(a) " >
b
2   b1
b
1 ;
(b) " >
b
2   b1eb0 ; and
(c) " >
b
2  eb0eb0 :
Proof. Using (21) and (22), it can be shown that (a) is equivalent to
0 >  n  n (1 + )w"
R
;
which is obviously satised. Moreover, (a) and eb0 > b1 imply (b) and (c):
Condition (40) holds if Q () > 0; where
Q () = eb0 (1 + ")  b2   "eb0 +b1   b2 :
Note that Q (1) = eb0   b1 > 0; and the inequalities in the Lemma 6 imply that
Q (0) = eb0 (1 + ")  b2 > 0
and
Q0 () =  

"eb0 +b1   b2 < 0:
This implies that Q () > 0 for all values of ; which means that condition (40) holds.
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Proof of Proposition 3. (a) We combine (36), (37), (38), and (39) to obtain
dM
dG

db=0
=  


1 + + 

1
n [1 + (1  ) "]

(1  )

R
w2

+
 eb0

"  R
w

< 0
and
dM
dG

dw=0
=


1 + + 

1
nb

(1  )

R
w

   

"  R
w

:
It is immediate to see that there exists a value of ; e; such dMdG dw=0  (<) 0 if
  (>) e, where e is dened in the statement of the proposition and (14) implies thate 2 (0; 1) :
(b) Note that
dM
dG

db=0
<
dM
dG

dw=0
when  = 0;whereas
dM
dG

db=0
<
dM
dG

dw=0
when  = 1: Moreover, given the expressions for the two derivatives, there exists a
unique value  2 (0; 1) such that
dM
dG

db=0
=
dM
dG

dw=0
:
Therefore,
dM
dG

db=0
>
dM
dG

dw=0
if and only if  > ; where
 =
1
' () 

"w
R   1

+ 1
and
' () =
1  b
[1 + (1  ) "]eb0
1 +
b
w [1 + (1  ) "]
:
Note that (40) implies that ' () 2 (0; 1) and (14) implies that  2 (0; 1) : It is
straightforward to show that  > e as ' () 2 (0; 1) :
Proof of Proposition 4. We use (36) and (37) to obtain the e¤ects of the introduction
of a subsidy when it is nanced with labor income taxes,
deb0
dse

db=0
= n

(1  )
1 + (1  ) "  
(1 + + )


< 0;
and when it is nanced with inheritance taxes,
deb0
dse

dw=0
= n
"
(1  )eb0
b
  1 + + 

#
< 0;
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since (1  )eb0 < (1  ) b2 < b: These inequalities imply that the introduction of an
education subsidy increases social mobility, which in turn increases aggregate income
in the long run.
Moreover, the inequality
deb0
dse

dw=0
>
deb0
dse

db=0
holds when [1 + (1  ) "]eb0 > b: In the proof of Proposition 2 we have already shown
that this inequality is satised.
Proof of Proposition 5. (a) We use (38), (37), (39) and (36) to obtain
dM
dse

dw=0
=


1 + + 
24  n"  Rw  (1++)eb0   (1 )b 
+(1  )

R
w

n(1 )
b
+ 1
 35 > 0
and
dM
dse

db=0
=


1 + + 
24   neb0 "  Rw  (1 )1+(1 )"   (1++) 
+(1  )

R
w

1  n(1 )w[1+(1 )"]
 35 > 0;
where the positive signs follow from (14), b
2
> eb0; and (23).
(b) Following the same steps as in the proof of part (b) of Proposition 3, it is
immediate to see that
dM
dse

db=0
>
dM
dse

dw=0
holds if and only  > :
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Figure 1. The dynamics of bequests. 
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Figure 2. The effect on the distribution of bequests of a rise 
in the inheritance tax or in the labor income tax. 
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Figure 3. The effect of a rise in the education subsidy rate. 
